Pakistan’s expanding defence-industrial footprint in the Gulf is intersecting with the intensifying rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, particularly across Sudan and Libya.
As orders for the JF-17 multirole jet fighter platform grow, Islamabad is finding that military partnerships are no longer easily compartmentalised.
Sources with intimate knowledge of Pakistan’s arms export practices claim that Islamabad will seek to avoid arms sales in regions of contested sovereignty, such as Sudan and Libya, where a United Nations embargo is in place. That would include indirect exports via Saudi Arabia or the UAE.
Several Pakistani sources with ties to the military and intelligence establishment note that should Islamabad be forced to take a position, it would err on the side of Riyadh.
A Reuters report from late December indicates that Pakistan and the Libyan National Army (LNA) have negotiated a multi-billion-dollar defence package, including JF-17 fighter jets and Super Mushshak trainers.
New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch
Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on
Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters
The report points to a $4bn agreement between Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir and Saddam Khalifa Haftar, the deputy commander-in-chief of the Benghazi-based LNA.
The LNA has long relied on external patrons, and any large-scale procurement would require third-party financial backing. Analysts frequently indicate that backing is linked to the UAE’s established support for Haftar’s de facto-controlled territories and a Pakistani source with ties to Gulf security circles.
Another January report from Reuters said Pakistan was on the verge of an arms deal with Sudan, which some have speculated could be tied to Saudi Arabia offering Pakistan the opportunity to convert $2bn in loans in exchange for a squadron of JF-17, and additional commitments to the tune of $2bn.
The agreement with Sudan was reportedly negotiated by Pakistan’s chief of the air staff, Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu, and Lieutenant General Turki bin Bander bin Abdulaziz of the Royal Saudi Air Force.
Why the JF-17?
The JF-17 Thunder is usually branded as a joint venture between Pakistan’s Aeronautical Complex and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, and marketed as a low-cost multirole fighter with beyond-visual-range capability.
Pakistan’s JF-17 platform is pursuing further sinification. As Chinese sub-systems are battle-tested, their value is multiplied, while Beijing builds doctrinal experience against Nato platforms (the F-16, Rafale, and Eurofighter) without being exposed to conflict.
The limited war between India and Pakistan in May 2025 is said to have bolstered the value proposition of the JF-17 platform, cementing a strategic symbiosis for the benefit of both Beijing and Islamabad.
Estimated unit costs vary widely depending on configuration and support packages. The platform’s affordability relative to western fighters such as the F-16 Block 70, Rafale, or Eurofighter Typhoon continues to drive interest among states seeking modern capability without the political constraints of western suppliers.
Various sources suggest each JF-17 unit costs in the $25-42m range, depending on the variant and customisation requirements of the client. This compares to $70-100m for an F-16 Block 70 Viper and $90-130m for a Dassault Rafale or a Eurofighter Typhoon.
In addition, the single-engine JF-17 has a longer range and runs at a fraction of the cost of either the American or the French platform.
The cost factor is significant for a range of buyers in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. There are, however, questions of industrial capacity.
Pakistan’s expanding order pipeline
Pakistan has confirmed exports of the JF-17 to Myanmar and Nigeria, and a confirmed export order to Azerbaijan, with initial deliveries.
Prolonged negotiations with Egypt and Iraq seem to have failed, mostly due to an unreliable financing framework. There are prospective and more promising negotiations with Indonesia and Bangladesh.
Saudi Arabia is not looking to acquire JF-17s for domestic use but rather for Sudan. Reuters reports that Riyadh is looking to supply the Sudanese government of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan against the Emirati-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) forces, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti.
The Haftar government continues to be the arms conduit of UAE weapons shipments to the RSF, Middle East Eye has previously reported, despite Egyptian and Saudi pressure towards Benghazi.
In the summer of 2025, RSF forces captured the tri-border area (Sudan, Egypt, and Libya), easing the way for the export of artisanal gold from Sudan and the import of ammunition via Libya.
While the Haftar government in Benghazi could use the jet fighters as a coercive tool against the UN-recognised and Turkish-backed Tripoli government, they can also be used to back RSF forces in the tri-border region.
Sources with intimate knowledge of the Pakistani military complex suggest the Haftar deal is founded on the assumption of Emirati financing. This fits Benghazi’s broader role as a logistics conduit for RSF forces.
Riyadh’s effective veto
Pakistan historically maintains amicable relations with all Gulf Cooperation Council countries, with military ties spearheading those relationships. Pakistan has been training Saudi pilots since 1967, a relationship Islamabad cultivated across the Arab world (Syria, Qatar, UAE, Jordan, Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya).
Commitment and compartmentalisation are key in these relationships.
“Pakistan has successfully navigated murky waters in the Gulf, staying out of the Yemeni conflict in 2015 while allowing Doha to use ports and air corridors during the blockade: now, as before, there is confidence that the Pakistani military will avoid getting stuck between the two,” Kamal Amal, a fellow with the Atlantic Council, told Middle East Eye.
However, both industrial logic and diplomatic realities suggest that, should Pakistan be pressed, Islamabad would lean towards Riyadh.
Many orders mean selective delivery.
First, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman signed a “strategic mutual defence agreement” in September 2025, signalling a new chapter of greater volume and far-reaching defence cooperation.
Furthermore, Pakistan is unlikely to go head-to-head against the Tripoli government, backed by Ankara. Pakistan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan form the so-called “Three Brothers Alliance”, a multi-layered partnership with a strong security dimension.
Turkey is a close military-industrial partner to both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Secondly, politics in action is the prioritisation of deliveries when the order book is congested. These priorities need to balance between Pakistan’s priorities and the consent of strategic suppliers, including China and Turkey.
The JF-17 Thunder is a joint programme between China and Pakistan. The platform has a range of strategic systems that are Chinese-made, including the KLJ-7A AESA system, Smart-HUD holographic display, and carries a PL-10 and PL-15 Chinese air-to-air missiles payload. Without Chinese strategic cooperation, the platform is not deliverable.
The weak link in the JF-17 supply chain is Russian. The JF-17 Block III engine is a Klimov RD-93 MA, and there are doubts as to whether Russia can or will support Pakistan’s surging order book or set a ceiling on the number of jet fighters Islamabad can reliably deliver.
One Pakistani source suggests there is a 25-frame limit a year, and any further scaling up of production would require considerable investment and a reliable supply chain.
While there is talk of a shift towards a Chinese-made Guizhou WS-13 Taishan, such a dramatic shift would need testing and possibly battle validation before it becomes commercially attractive.
The aircraft also carries a Turkish-made targeting pod, Aselpod, and can be customised to carry Gokdogan and Bozdogan air-to-air missiles. Azerbaijan’s order is likely to be customised with a greater role for Turkey in the supply chain.
Saudi Arabia key to Pakistan’s export ambitions
The Russian element is industrially necessary but politically expendable. Turkey’s role is non-negotiable. Ankara and Islamabad are close partners in Turkey’s 5th Generation Kaan programme, UAVs, and maritime platforms, with a view to joint exports to third countries.
The Saudi kingdom is a major client for the Kaan, and Ankara is a strategic partner in Riyadh’s localisation drive, as the kingdom aims to locally produce 50 percent of its procurement needs by 2030.
In effect, if not in principle, the Saudi and Turkish realities make Pakistan’s military-industrial priorities clear.
The Pakistani order book is mounting, but can only advance to delivery with Chinese and Turkish support. Pakistan has to upgrade approximately 50 Block II units to Block III and deliver 40 jets to Baku.
Reported agreements with Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq for dozens of jets are precariously founded on poor financial guarantees, with the added cost of international embargoes. In effect, these cannot be a priority.
Negotiations with Bangladesh and Indonesia would require major investment in capacity and are more likely to lay the foundations for the dependable revenue needed for industrial investment.
Pakistan is likely to avoid prioritising the delivery of JF-17s to war zones under a UN embargo, such as Sudan.
First, there is no surplus of jet fighters, and the pipeline is congested. Secondly, because Islamabad likes to maintain an equal distance between its partners in the Gulf and cannot be seen as supplying both sides of the Sudanese proxy war.
Lastly, states with contested sovereignty are not good clients for platforms that require multi-annual cooperation, including training, localised expertise, and reliable funding.
If pressure mounts for delivery, deeper diplomatic ties with the Saudi kingdom and Turkey’s strategic priorities point to prioritising Riyadh.
The prospects of Islamabad delivering on its Libyan deal are dim, but this might be the first and perhaps the easiest of dilemmas for the Turkish-Pakistani military industrial complex in the Gulf, given the polarisation between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by PostX News and is published from a syndicated feed.)
